Download "Ukrainian Attacks on Russian Shadow Fleet Bear Fruit: Companies Cancel Contracts"

🟢 Link to our beautiful website: https://www.rfunews.com/it 🔞 Uncensored and exclusive videos: https://t.me/RFUItaliano 🔵 Support us with a monthly subscription: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCT4JL-7_Vecaw9Efs7wf4EA/join 🔵 Support us with the Super Thank You button (next to Like/Share) Today's news concerns the Black Sea. Ukrainian strategy against Russian shadow logistics has already led to the disabling of three ships, increasing the risks of operating on Russia's export routes. The results have been much more immediate and devastating than expected, with companies already abandoning the Russian fleet and reconsidering their Black Sea business. The strongest signal comes from Besiktas Shipping, which has halted all projects with Russia after one of its oil tankers was damaged near Senegal. The company emphasizes operating within sanctions limits, despite its ships ending up on routes connected to Russian shadow logistics. Besiktas controls approximately 15 tankers, removing several hundred thousand tons of oil annually from Russia's shipping capacity. The precise outcome Ukraine seeks, and the fact that some are already withdrawing, means it is taking effect faster than even Kyiv expected. Losing even a small group of compliant and insurable vessels pushes Russia toward older, higher-risk vessels. With approximately half of the 500 tankers carrying sanctioned Russian crude owned or leased abroad, the addition of other companies to the same line would deprive Moscow of a large portion of the fleet that keeps exports active. If all foreign lessors were to withdraw, Russia would lose access to approximately half of its maritime oil export capacity, equivalent to over $100 billion in lost revenue annually, wiping out more than a quarter of the federal budget dependent on oil and gas taxes. This reveals the structural weakness of relying on leased tonnage: Moscow cannot force it to stay, while Ukraine can persuade it to do otherwise. The importance of the Black Sea Route makes these changes even more significant, as ports such as Novorossiysk and Tuapse previously handled approximately a fifth of Russia's seaborne exports of crude oil and petroleum products, constituting a central component of federal revenue. Oil and gas revenues still provide approximately a third of the national budget and around fifteen percent of GDP, making any prolonged disruption immediately noticeable. If insurers restrict voyages to the Black Sea and shipowners deem the risks too high, the impact becomes severe. Export volumes are declining, Russia is becoming more dependent on older vessels with lower standards, and each withdrawal introduces new planning gaps and revenue instability. Moscow's initial reactions reveal the true extent of the charade, so much so that Putin has threatened to lay siege at sea if the attacks continue. Russian commentators have suggested targeting merchant ships bound for Ukrainian ports or declaring parts of the Black Sea unsafe for navigation. In practice, these options are extremely limited. Ships supplying Ukraine operate under multiple flags and are insured by Western companies that have already accepted war risk coverage to keep the corridor open. Any attack on this traffic risks a clash with states that have so far remained outside the direct conflict, including Turkey, which controls the straits on which Russia remains dependent. An escalation at sea would therefore strengthen Ukraine's position more than Russia's.