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00:00:00
The outlook for Russia is dire. At least
according to the experts. Ever since Russia 00:00:05
launched its invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, various Western leaders, think tanks, 00:00:11
and media have confidently predicted that the
Russian economy was collapsing. In particular, 00:00:17
experts have provided assessment after assessment
that the Russian defense industry was falling 00:00:22
apart. It is unable to cope with the effects of
sanctions, financial instability, and lack of 00:00:29
qualified workers to meet the increasing demands
of the war – or so the story goes. Despite being 00:00:35
hit with an unprecedented number of sanctions,
exclusion from the SWIFT financial messaging 00:00:40
system that enables international payments, and
taking serious losses in manpower and equipment 00:00:46
on the battlefield, these predictions of imminent
collapse have not come to pass. As the title of a 00:00:53
recent paper by the Center for Strategic Studies,
or CSIS, puts it, the Russian economy is “Down But 00:01:00
Not Out.” Now, as we head towards the end of the
fourth year of war in Ukraine, some experts are 00:01:07
claiming that 2026 will be the year that Russia’s
defense industry collapses once and for all. 00:01:14
Let’s take a look at the evidence and how likely
that really is. In a recent article published in 00:01:21
Defense Blog, Dylan Malyusov makes the case that
Russia’s defense industry is facing its deepest 00:01:27
crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Peruvian-born Ukrainian-educated Malyusov 00:01:34
is the editor-in-chief of the publication and a
recipient of a “For Assistance to the Armed Forces 00:01:39
of Ukraine” medal for his informational services
to the nation. Citing “internal assessments and 00:01:45
correspondence circulating among defense‑sector
managers,” which he does not share, he explains 00:01:51
how Russian defense plants are now creaking at
the seams. They increasingly lack the workforce, 00:01:57
financial stability, and supply chains required
to sustain production of weapons and military 00:02:02
equipment – and it’s only getting worse.
Undoubtedly, the Russian labor market has 00:02:08
undergone major upheaval since President Vladimir
Putin instituted a range of measures to kick the 00:02:14
economy into a wartime footing. An estimated
2 million men of working age have exited the 00:02:20
workforce. Roughly half of those fled the country
in 2023 after the announcement of a partial 00:02:26
mobilization, with most being from higher-income,
white collar professions. The rest have been 00:02:31
mobilized or voluntarily signed up for military
contracts. Some will return to the workforce 00:02:37
after their contracts end. Many won’t – they’re
dead or permanently disabled. To entice citizens 00:02:45
to sign up for the military in large numbers,
Russia dramatically raised basic salaries and 00:02:50
signing-on bonuses. In February 2022, before the
invasion began, junior officers were earning just 00:02:57
over 81,000 rubles per month, or around $1,030. By
October of that year, the minimum monthly pay for 00:03:06
frontline troops had risen to its current official
level, approximately 195,000 rubles, or $2,480 – a 00:03:15
240 percent increase. That’s almost 14 times
higher than the median salary in some regions 00:03:22
of Russia. Moreover, as of mid-2024, the average
one-time payment that soldiers receive when they 00:03:30
sign their contract reached 485,000 rubles, or
$5,300, roughly equivalent to the average annual 00:03:38
per capita income in Russia. In total, recruits
in regions like Moscow and Leningrad Oblast can 00:03:45
receive up to 5.3 million rubles ($60,592) and at
least 3 million rubles ($34,955), respectively, 00:03:57
over a year of service, including all payments
and salaries. Of course, this being Russia, 00:04:03
there have been regular reports of delays
with payments, corruption, and underpayment. 00:04:08
Nonetheless, those are big numbers for the average
Ivan, and have transformed military service into 00:04:14
one of the most lucrative professions in Russia.
The result has been to suck skilled employees 00:04:20
out of the economy into the military, creating
significant wage inflation in the process as other 00:04:26
industries bump up their own salary offers to
try and attract and retain employees. In Russia’s 00:04:32
defense industries, salaries have also risen, as
companies desperately try to secure enough of a 00:04:38
workforce to fulfil the growing orders from the
state for weaponry and equipment to be used in 00:04:44
Ukraine. However, in many cases, these companies
are compelled to meet these growing orders at 00:04:50
prices that don’t cover production costs, and the
rising salaries they are forced to pay are only 00:04:55
ratcheting up the financial pressure on them. It’s
fair to say that Russia has resisted the avalanche 00:05:01
of sanctions unleashed on it from the West far
better than anyone expected. As U.S. Treasury 00:05:07
Secretary Scott Bessent bluntly commented recently
on the EU’s 19th package of sanctions against 00:05:13
Russia, “If you’re going to do something 19 times,
you’ve failed.” In response to Bessent’s comment, 00:05:20
Leonid Slutsky, Chairman of the Russian State
Duma Committee on International Affairs, 00:05:24
told news agency TASS that “[…] The Russian
economy has adjusted to the pressure of sanctions, 00:05:30
which cannot be said about the EU economy. The
sanctions have boomeranged on it, devastating its 00:05:35
growth and have had an extremely negative impact
on the standard of living of ordinary Europeans.” 00:05:41
Well, Russia may have adjusted, but it
certainly hasn’t been without costs, 00:05:45
especially in the production of more advanced
military equipment, where the sanctions slammed 00:05:50
the door shut on many critical raw materials,
oils, coatings, electronics, technical fluids, 00:05:56
and more. Russia has been able to produce some
of these domestically, which in some ways has 00:06:01
produced a hidden benefit from sanctions. The
rest has required them to work around or source 00:06:06
through a complicated, murky web of third-party
arrangements. And all those middlemen and extra 00:06:12
logistics required to land the parts only mean
one thing – higher costs. Add rising component 00:06:19
costs – in some cases reportedly up to 100 times
as much as pre-sanctions – to rising wages and 00:06:26
persistently high inflation in general, and the
costs just keep going up for these companies, 00:06:31
even as the prices they’re able to sell to
the state remain constant. Being compelled to 00:06:36
deliver state orders at set prices that are often
below the cost of production is nothing new in 00:06:41
Russia. Neither are sizable state subsidies
to enable these companies to keep afloat, 00:06:47
which are still being provided. In fact, it’s
precisely this kind of circular subsidized system 00:06:53
that enabled Russia to keep much of its vast
Soviet-era military industrial complex treading 00:06:58
water since the Soviet Union’s collapse. Although
there were significant initial challenges, 00:07:04
at least a reasonably effective military
industrial base existed to ramp up production 00:07:09
when the war started. In contrast, NATO countries
with freer-market economies lacked such systems, 00:07:16
causing many Cold War-era military industries—like
shipbuilding in the U.S.—to decline due to reduced 00:07:22
demand during peacetime. As Europe embarks
on its own massive rearmament program, 00:07:27
it will be interesting to see how European
nations handle similar challenges, ramping 00:07:32
up their own production lines and supply chains.
For the Russian defense industry, companies are 00:07:38
faced with increasing demand from the state
for increasingly loss-making products, with 00:07:43
increasingly urgent and consequential delivery
deadlines. The more deliveries missed, the tougher 00:07:49
it is for the troops on the frontlines. But their
problems hardly stop there. The extra state demand 00:07:55
for weapons has also created a ripple effect of
downstream headaches for the defense industry. 00:08:01
For starters, historically, Russian defense
firms have made up the shortfall in revenue from 00:08:06
below-cost sales to the state with the windfall
from lucrative export orders. As a result of the 00:08:12
massive arms build-ups during the peak of the Cold
War, the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been 00:08:17
the world’s largest two military exporters, with
the U.S. way ahead, but Russia in a comfortable 00:08:23
second place. However, even before the war began,
Russian military exports had begun dropping. And 00:08:30
since 2022, they’ve fallen off so alarmingly that
Russia has been knocked off its number two spot 00:08:36
by France, if only marginally. Where Russia made
deliveries to 31 countries before its invasion, 00:08:42
it only had 12 customers in 2024. Sanctions have
undoubtedly played a huge role in persuading many 00:08:49
nations to suspend or stop arms purchases from
Russia. That process seems to have started as 00:08:55
early as the initial set of sanctions placed on
Russia following its annexation of Crimea in 2014. 00:09:02
Russia has lost access to many foreign markets,
and buyers have canceled or frozen contracts due 00:09:08
to the fear of coming under sanctions themselves
and the inability of Russian firms to actually 00:09:13
deliver. Increasing competition from emerging
defense players like Israel, Turkey, South Korea, 00:09:20
and India has also eaten into Russian market
share in bread-and-butter markets in Asia, Africa, 00:09:26
and Latin America. And the poor performance of
many of Russia’s weapons systems in Ukraine, 00:09:32
especially in 2022 and 2023, when the
bulk of the drop-off in exports occurred, 00:09:38
undoubtedly didn’t help in drumming up demand.
But the biggest factor in the precipitous drop 00:09:43
in Russia’s military exports is that the
weapons are needed by the state in Ukraine, 00:09:48
and are simply not available for export. Denis
Manturov, First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, 00:09:54
told Interfax in 2023 that a “significant” portion
of weapons being produced in the country is being 00:10:01
directed to Ukrainian battlefields. “Their
provision is our absolute priority,” he said, 00:10:06
and given Russia’s enormous losses since then, the
Russian army’s needs have only increased. Bottom 00:10:12
line: due to this combination of sanctions,
poor performance, and redirected supply, 00:10:18
several major multi-billion dollar deals have
gone by the wayside. Egypt cancelled a major 00:10:23
order for Su-35 fighter jets in early 2022, citing
concerns over performance and Western pressure. 00:10:31
Algeria and Indonesia both cancelled planned
purchases of Russian combat aircraft after 00:10:37
Russia was unable to supply the aircraft
ordered due to the demands of the war, 00:10:42
and the buyers were unhappy with the replacement
plan. And Philippines cancelled a $12.7 00:10:48
billion deal for 16 Mi-17 helicopters in 2022,
reportedly under heavy U.S. diplomatic pressure. 00:10:56
These cancellations don’t just affect the
large, typically state-owned enterprises that 00:11:01
ultimately roll out major weapons systems like
tanks, airplanes, and ships. It also affects the 00:11:07
dozens of smaller, typically privately-owned,
businesses that supply raw materials, parts, 00:11:13
and services. And to make matters worse, the state
– the primary customer – is evidently running into 00:11:19
trouble paying on time, even while deliveries
are expected nonetheless, and there are stiff 00:11:24
legal consequences for non-delivery. On top of all
the other pressures on them, this leaves factories 00:11:30
unable to cover wages, settle with suppliers,
or purchase components. According to Matyusov, 00:11:36
one of the documents in his possession states
that “the shipment of tanks in January has still 00:11:41
not been paid for,” even while the contractor
remains legally obligated to deliver new vehicles 00:11:46
throughout the year. To top it all off, there’s
the nagging issue of constant Ukrainian drone and 00:11:52
missile strikes on Russian energy and military
industrial facilities, and sabotage. In October, 00:11:58
Ukraine claimed to have struck the Sverdlov
ammunition plant in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, 00:12:04
a facility producing aviation bombs, artillery
ordnance, and anti-aircraft munitions. Previously, 00:12:11
in August, in the same oblast, Ukraine struck the
Arzamas instrument-making plant, which produces 00:12:17
optical, electronic, and navigation systems for
Russian military aircraft, missiles, and vehicles. 00:12:24
In April, Ukrainian drones reportedly damaged
the Fiber Optic Systems plant in Saransk, the 00:12:30
sole Russian manufacturer of fiber-optic cables
used in military drones and secure communications 00:12:36
systems – and there have been many more. Given
that most of Ukraine’s long-range drones, at 00:12:41
least until recently, have packed relatively small
warheads, most of these strikes have inflicted 00:12:47
non-catastrophic damage, with the enterprises hit
being able to restore operations within a matter 00:12:52
of days or weeks. Still, with dozens, if not
hundreds, of drones piercing Russian air defenses 00:12:58
nightly, these strikes have certainly disrupted
Russian military production and exacerbated the 00:13:04
financial nightmare for many companies. These
strikes have also undoubtedly cost the Russian 00:13:09
war machine perhaps tens or hundreds of billions
of dollars and forced Putin to reassign valuable 00:13:15
air defense and other resources away from the
frontlines to defend key infrastructure and 00:13:21
military facilities. He was even forced to conduct
a limited mobilization of veterans from Ukraine, 00:13:27
specifically to defend infrastructure in their
regions. Add it all up – the lack of labor, the 00:13:33
loss of exports, the costs of sanctions evasion,
the low prices paid by the state (if they pay at 00:13:39
all), the regular strikes, etc. – and according
to Malyusov, most of the defense industry is 00:13:45
buckling under unbearable pressure. Even some of
the largest, most systemically important plants 00:13:51
are showing visible signs of distress. Malyusov
cites an email from early 2024 from Dmitry Fadeev, 00:13:59
CEO of the large-scale Murom Machine-Building
Plant, which was reportedly intercepted by the 00:14:05
Ukrainian Cyber Resistance activist group, who
then shared it with Ukraine’s National Resistance 00:14:10
Center. In it, writing in his capacity as chairman
of the Vladimir Oblast Defense Companies League, 00:14:17
Fadeev complained that plants are forced to sell
their goods at 2019 prices, but at the same time 00:14:22
are expected to purchase their inputs at market
prices, and in advance. He said that the money 00:14:29
received from the government was not sufficient
to even cover the interest on the credit that his 00:14:33
firm would need to take out to pay its suppliers.
The high costs of borrowing are a common complaint 00:14:39
throughout the Russian economy these days. With
rates still sky-high at over 20 percent, economic 00:14:45
growth has slowed to hover at around recession
levels. Companies simply can’t afford to borrow, 00:14:51
so growth, capital investments, and R&D have all
slowed almost to the point of stagnation across 00:14:56
many sectors of the economy. Moreover, Fadeev
says, the government money is tied up until 00:15:02
the completion of the contracts, which normally
last three to five years – meaning during this 00:15:08
time the money is effectively “frozen.” He also
complains that there is a shortage of staff at the 00:15:13
plants due to both mass mobilization and a lack of
accommodation in the area. As a result, the Murom 00:15:20
Machine-Building Plant had lost 70 million rubles
(approximately $770,000) in the production of the 00:15:27
“Device 1T146” navigation systems alone, and was
now struggling to keep up with the ever-growing 00:15:34
state demand for its devices. The authenticity
of the document purported to be Fadeev’s email is 00:15:41
difficult to verify, and it’s unclear whether the
issues described have subsequently been resolved. 00:15:47
One thing’s for sure, though, the Ukrainian
strike on the plant, which produces ignition 00:15:51
components for ammunition used by Russia's Armed
Forces, Interior Ministry, and Federal Security 00:15:57
Service (the FSB), on April 30, didn’t make
the situation there any easier. Malyusov also 00:16:05
claims that the United Aircraft Corporation, or
UAC, a key producer of Russian combat aircraft, 00:16:11
faced a shortage of funds to pay contractors and
is now entangled in hundreds of cases in court 00:16:17
for compensation of debt. However, he provides no
references for this claim, and we were unable to 00:16:23
find any other sources to corroborate it. On
the contrary, at least according to official 00:16:28
Russian data, UAC appears to be delivering on
its commitments, and then some. In November, 00:16:34
the company announced delivery of the latest
batch of Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers and Su-35S 00:16:41
fighter jets. That followed deliveries of Su-34s
in September and October, and Su-35Ss in August. 00:16:49
UAC CEO Vadim Badekha emphasized that the staff
at UAC’s production facilities are maintaining a 00:16:56
high manufacturing pace to meet the scheduled
delivery targets. “The engineers at the Sukhoi 00:17:01
Design Bureau continue to refine and enhance the
aircraft systems, leveraging insights gained from 00:17:07
their operational deployment during the special
military operation. These improvements are aimed 00:17:12
at increasing the aircraft’s effectiveness in
current and future missions,” he said. At least on 00:17:18
the face of it, the company’s deeds are matching
his words. In a bit of serious respite for Russia 00:17:24
from the debilitating effects of sanctions, UAC
also recently launched the long-delayed MC-21 00:17:31
passenger jet. Showcased at the recent Dubai Air
Show, the MC-21 is a narrow-body jet comparable to 00:17:39
the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320, and is purportedly
Russia’s first entirely domestically produced, 00:17:47
import-substituted aircraft. With half of Russia’s
Airbus A320neo fleet grounded due to unresolved 00:17:54
engine issues exacerbated by sanctions, the
aviation industry is an area where sanctions 00:18:00
have bitten hardest. Moscow aims to produce more
than 600 new planes by 2030 to replace its aging 00:18:08
Western fleet, and the MC-21 and Yakovlev SJ-100,
also manufactured by UAC, are expected to form 00:18:16
the bulk of that. All things considered, with a
government pledge of over $2.7 billion to develop 00:18:23
domestic aircraft, including Yakovlev’s SJ-100 and
the MC-21, and clear prioritization from Moscow, 00:18:31
it’s likely that even if Malyusov’s claims
about UAC being involved in hundreds of court 00:18:36
cases are true, the company has likely
been able to fend them off. Then again, 00:18:41
with what’s going on at Uralvagonzavod
[OO-ruhl-vah-GON-zah-vod], UVZ for short, 00:18:45
you can’t be too sure of that. The giant Russian
tank and freight railcar manufacturer, located in 00:18:51
the city of Nizhny Tagil [NIZH-nee TAH-gill], some
870 miles east of Moscow, announced in November 00:18:57
that it was restructuring its operations to reduce
costs, including, reportedly, up to 10 percent of 00:19:03
its staff. Citing an internal document, local news
outlet E1 reported that UVZ planned to make cuts 00:19:10
of up to 50 percent across various departments
by February 2026 and to stop new hiring. 00:19:17
Asked about the report, UVZ told Reuters that
“In the current environment, like any other 00:19:23
enterprise, UVZ is carrying out restructuring,
primarily aimed at optimizing administrative and 00:19:29
management expenses.” It added that UVZ continues
to work “at high intensity” to fulfil a state 00:19:35
defense order, and that new hiring continues.
Certainly, based on official Russian reports, 00:19:41
UVZ is still delivering on those orders.
In November, the company announced delivery 00:19:46
of the first batch of freshly-upgraded TOS-1A
Solntsepyok [soln-tsep-YOK] thermobaric multiple 00:19:52
rocket launchers. And in October, it announced
that it had delivered the first batch of a new, 00:19:57
unspecified tank support vehicle. The upgraded
vehicle reportedly features enhanced reactive 00:20:03
armor and additional side protection. That’s
because the issue at UVZ isn’t really related 00:20:08
to the defense side of its business, but rather to
the railcar division. The company, and most others 00:20:14
across the entire energy logistics industry in
Russia, is grappling with a deep and sustained 00:20:19
decline in demand for freight railcars. That’s due
to a steep fall in cargo volume, due in turn to 00:20:25
major disruptions in major exports caused by the
West’s economic and Ukraine’s “kinetic” sanctions. 00:20:32
One large defense company that is undoubtedly
in deep financial trouble is AO Kronstadt, 00:20:38
one of Russia’s biggest drone manufacturers and
the producer of the Orion and Inokhodets systems. 00:20:44
In 2022, it proudly announced the expansion of
production at its two Moscow-region UAV assembly 00:20:50
plants. Now, it’s on the verge of bankruptcy
after months of financial turmoil, lawsuits, 00:20:56
and battlefield setbacks. Even before the war
began, the company’s finances were shaky. In 2020, 00:21:03
Kronstadt reported revenues of about 2 billion
rubles, or $25 million, but suffered losses of 00:21:10
more than 3.5 billion rubles, around $45 million.
But the real problems actually began soon after 00:21:17
that 2022 announcement, when Kronstadt’s main
investor, AFK Sistema, pulled out. Without that 00:21:24
financial backing, the company’s debt ballooned,
while it struggled to keep pace with increasing 00:21:29
production demands. Throw all the other broader
industry problems that we’ve discussed into the 00:21:34
mix – staff shortages, problems getting parts,
spiraling costs, etc. – and by 2025, it’s all 00:21:41
imploded spectacularly. The company is facing more
than 40 lawsuits totaling 626.3 million rubles, 00:21:49
or roughly $7 million. Subcontractors are
reportedly rushing to file claims early, fearing 00:21:56
the company’s likely bankruptcy. It’s unclear to
what extent the legal battles have affected the 00:22:01
company’s ability to deliver on the state’s orders
thus far. But losing Kronstadt would undoubtedly 00:22:07
represent a major setback for Russia’s defense
industry and its military operations, which 00:22:13
increasingly rely on unmanned aerial systems.
That’s why Moscow is unlikely to allow that to 00:22:19
happen. If push comes to shove, Putin will almost
certainly nationalize the company and restore 00:22:25
production rapidly. He regularly loses S-400
air defense systems worth many times more than 00:22:31
Kronstadt’s debt to Ukrainian precision strikes,
so it’s basically a no-brainer. Taking everything 00:22:37
into account, with Malyusov’s article painting
a bleak picture of Russia’s defense industry—and 00:22:43
similar sentiments echoed in much Western analysis
of Russia’s economy and military sector—you might 00:22:49
anticipate finding clear signs of trouble reported
in the Russian media, even if subtle hints must be 00:22:55
gleaned. But political expression is, of course,
harshly suppressed in Russia. However, when it 00:23:01
comes to economic and financial matters, there
tends to be a longer leash. You can moan about the 00:23:06
rising cost of living or argue why rates should be
cut without fear of being dragged off by the FSB. 00:23:12
And in today’s environment, millions do. Scrolling
through the news on, say, the well-established 00:23:18
financial outlet Kommersant, there’s clear
concern about stagnant growth and investment, 00:23:24
persistently high interest rates and inflation,
and high levels of debt, to name but a few of the 00:23:29
obvious problems with the Russian economy. But
you get the sense that they feel the situation 00:23:34
is still under control, that they still have
levers to pull, and it’s a question of choosing 00:23:39
the right ones. “The economy was overheating. We
took measures to slow it down,” they might argue. 00:23:46
“They worked, but maybe a bit too well. Now we
need to take the right measures to start growing 00:23:51
again.” The consensus seems to be something
along those lines. As for the defense industry, 00:23:57
Alexander Mikhailov, head of the Russian Bureau
of Military-Political Analysis, told TASS in 00:24:03
November, “At the macro level, Russia outperforms
the entire defense industrial complex of united 00:24:09
Europe in weapons and ammunition. Europe, with its
half-billion population and about thirty developed 00:24:15
countries – at least ten of which have established
defense industries – cannot currently compete with 00:24:20
Russia's combined defense sector. This is a
significant advantage." He also claims that 00:24:25
Russia's foreign contracts [i.e., defense exports]
now total around $60 billion, and after the end of 00:24:33
the special military operation, Russia is expected
to earn even more from arms exports. Time will 00:24:39
tell whether he’s right, or it’s all a bluff,
and 2026 is the year when all the predictions 00:24:45
of Russia’s imminent demise finally come to
pass. Make sure you subscribe to our channel 00:24:52
and enable notifications for more deep dives into
topical military matters. Thanks for watching.Description:
Experts have long predicted Russia’s defense industry was on the brink, squeezed by sanctions, labor losses, soaring costs, and shrinking exports. Yet production has persisted even as factories face shortages, unpaid orders, and repeated strikes. Support us directly as we bring you independent, up-to-date reporting on military news and global conflicts by clicking here: SOURCES: https://pastebin.com/BbYieELx
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Which format of "Putin Is DOOMED... Russia's Military Will COLLAPSE in 2026" video should I choose?
The best quality formats are FullHD (1080p), 2K (1440p), 4K (2160p) and 8K (4320p). The higher the resolution of your screen, the higher the video quality should be. However, there are other factors to consider: download speed, amount of free space, and device performance during playback.
Why does my computer freeze when loading a "Putin Is DOOMED... Russia's Military Will COLLAPSE in 2026" video?
The browser/computer should not freeze completely! If this happens, please report it with a link to the video. Sometimes videos cannot be downloaded directly in a suitable format, so we have added the ability to convert the file to the desired format. In some cases, this process may actively use computer resources.
How can I download "Putin Is DOOMED... Russia's Military Will COLLAPSE in 2026" video to my phone?
You can download a video to your smartphone using the website or the PWA application UDL Lite. It is also possible to send a download link via QR code using the UDL Helper extension.
How can I download an audio track (music) to MP3 "Putin Is DOOMED... Russia's Military Will COLLAPSE in 2026"?
The most convenient way is to use the UDL Client program, which supports converting video to MP3 format. In some cases, MP3 can also be downloaded through the UDL Helper extension.
How can I save a frame from a video "Putin Is DOOMED... Russia's Military Will COLLAPSE in 2026"?
This feature is available in the UDL Helper extension. Make sure that "Show the video snapshot button" is checked in the settings. A camera icon should appear in the lower right corner of the player to the left of the "Settings" icon. When you click on it, the current frame from the video will be saved to your computer in JPEG format.
How do I play and download streaming video?
- in video formats, hover your mouse over "Streaming Video**";
- right-click on "Copy link";
- open VLC-player;
- select Media - Open Network Stream - Network in the menu;
- paste the copied link into the input field;
- click "Play".
- copy the video address (URL);
- select "Open Network Stream" in the "Media" item of VLC player and paste the link to the video into the input field;
- click on the arrow on the "Play" button and select "Convert" in the list;
- select "Video - H.264 + MP3 (MP4)" in the "Profile" line;
- click the "Browse" button to select a folder to save the converted video and click the "Start" button;
- conversion speed depends on the resolution and duration of the video.
For this purpose you need VLC-player, which can be downloaded for free from the official website https://www.videolan.org/vlc/.
How to play streaming video through VLC player:
To download streaming video via VLC player, you need to convert it:
Warning: this download method no longer works with most YouTube videos.
What's the price of all this stuff?
It costs nothing. Our services are absolutely free for all users. There are no PRO subscriptions, no restrictions on the number or maximum length of downloaded videos.